Judge Lawrence Mintoff, dismissed claims by property owners seeking to challenge the rent arrangements of their property, citing disproportionate interference with their property rights.
In a significant ruling in the names Galdes et vs State Advocate et delivered on 3 July 2024, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its Constitutional Jurisdiction, presided over by Judge Lawrence Mintoff, dismissed claims by property owners seeking to challenge the rent arrangements of their property, citing disproportionate interference with their property rights.
The property in question was initially granted on a temporary emphyteutical concession by the plaintiffs’ ascendants in 1975, and subsequently renewed in 1992. The current tenant however is the daughter of the original emphyteuta, and she has been occupying the property for around 30 years and was until recently paying an annual rent set at €279.72. This rent had been reviewed and increased to €2,500 yearly following a ruling by the Rent Regulation Board in a separate case between the owners and the tenant.
The plaintiffs argued that the fixed rent which they were receiving until recently does not reflect the market value over of the property over the years and sought compensation and damages, claiming that the operation of the law constituted a disproportionate interference with their property rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. They contended that the forced lease and the legislative framework governing it were unfair and deprived them of the enjoyment of their property.
Amongst other vital pleas, the State Advocate countered the plaintiff’s claim by stating that two of the plaintiffs were not suited to stand as plaintiffs. The reasoning behind this stemmed from the fact that two plaintiffs concerned resided abroad and were not being represented as required procedurally. The Court noted that a copy of their passports was presented in the acts of the case and showed that these two plaintiffs resided abroad. More crucially, despite one of the plaintiffs testifying that she had a power of attorney to represent the mentioned claimants, the Court noted that no power of attorney had been presented in the acts of the case. Therefore, the Court ruled that these two claimants were not suited to stand as plaintiffs.
However, the most significant point tackled in the case concerned the applicability of the old rent laws regime and their applicability in the case at hand.
The State Advocate insisted that the applicants must show that the current tenant resides in the property on the strength of a particular article of the Housing Decontrol Ordinance. The State Advocate submitted that after the expiry of the first contract of 1975, where the ascendants of the applicants had granted the property with a title of temporary emphytheus for the period of 17 years to the father of the tenant, another contract had been signed with the original emphyteuta in May 1992, where once again the property was given to him under a title of temporary emphytheus for another period of 17 years. The State Advocate maintained that therefore it is precisely this last contract that counts, but according to sub-article 12(2) of the Housing Decontrol Ordinance, since the latter emphyteutical concession was granted after 21 June 1979, it was only the original emphyteuta who has the right to continue occupying the premises with a title of rent from the direct owner. Therefore, the respondent State Advocate maintained that the Court action cannot succeed because the claimants had no obligation to extend the lease after it expired in the year 2009.
The Court accepted this argument and held that the protection provided by the law allowing the emphyteuta of a temporary concession to convert that concession to a lease title, is not applicable in the event that the emphyteuta at the end of that emphyteutical grant is not the original emphyteuta. Therefore, the claimants had no obligation to accept that the current tenant, daughter of the original emphyteuta, continues to reside in the premises under a leasehold title after the emphytheutic concession expired. Therefore, the tenant today benefits from a tenancy title arising from a bilateral agreement with the applicants, and it was not the law that imposed the relationship of owner and tenant between the parties. The Court also stated that this present lease came into effect after the amendments made through Act XXXI of 1995, and therefore the owners cannot complain of any restriction on the conditions of the lease imposed by the law as applicable before 1 June, 1995.
As a result, the Court pronounced itself by rejecting the claims of the applicant.
The mentioned Court case may be subject to an appeal.
Av. Gianluca Cappitta
Partner
Mifsud & Mifsud Advocates
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